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The hope that prevailed immediately after the collapse of state socialism was that Eastern 
Europe’s environmental pollution would be “swept away by democracy and economic 
rationality.” While with time such expectations have become more modest, some of the same 
hopes are now resurfacing as the accession of most former socialist countries to the European 
Union becomes imminent. Most environmentalists and policy experts anticipate an improvement 
in regulatory standards, in law enforcement, and in the availability of funding for environmental 
purposes. The purpose of this paper is to evaluate whether and how such expectations are being 
met in one area of environmental policies in Hungary, a country among the first wave of 
candidates to be admitted to the EU. 
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The hope that prevailed immediately after the collapse of state socialism was that Eastern 
Europe’s environmental pollution would be “swept away by democracy and economic 
rationality” (Solomon, 1990, A14). While with time such expectations have become more 
modest (Andersen, 2002; Andrews, 1993; Bochniarz and Kerekes 1994; Gille, 2000a, 2000b, 
2001; Kaderják and Powell, 1997; Kindler, 1994; Manser, 1993), some of the same hopes are 
now resurfacing as the accession of most former socialist countries to the European Union 
becomes imminent. Most environmentalists and policy experts anticipate an improvement in 
regulatory standards, in law enforcement, and in the availability of funding for environmental 
purposes. The purpose of this paper is to evaluate whether and how such expectations are being 
met in one area of environmental policies in Hungary, a country among the first wave of 
candidates to be admitted to the EU.  
 
The area I will examine here is waste. While according to Western European reports, the 
environmental accession requirements grew increasingly less significant in the enlargement 
negotiations (Environment Daily, 1999a, 1999b —much to the disappointment of some industrial 
lobbies and environmental organisations in the West (Friends of the Earth, 2002; Stirith, 2000) – 
the Hungarian newsreader was compelled to form an entirely different impression. Reports in the 
Hungarian media about the progress made in meeting the accession requirements frequently 
mentioned waste legislation on the “to-do-list” of several candidate countries, as well as of 
Hungary. In the latter, it was primarily the delay in ratifying the Act on Waste Management and 
its enforcement regulations that kept the Commission admonishing the country for not fulfilling 
the accession requirements quickly enough. Given that in the Hungarian adoption of the Acquis 
Communautaire, it was the environmental chapters that were lagging behind the others as well as 
behind the agreed-upon deadlines, waste legislation appeared as the single greatest obstacle to 
joining Europe (Environment Daily, 1999b; Environment Daily 2000). Instead of concluding 
from this that Hungary’s waste practices and policies, or the domestic expertise in this area were 
backward and that the country’s waste situation carries the symbolic burden of non-
Europeanness, as it is often the case in representations of the region, we must look into why it 
was exactly that waste legislation was held up.  
 
I will demonstrate that a key reason for this delay is the fact that the European Union 
itself has been sending mixed messages to Hungary. Officially, the EU stands for preventative 
policies, primarily waste reduction and secondarily reuse. In practice, however, its economic 
constituents as well as its aid encourage remedial end-of-pipe technologies, such as waste dumps 
and incinerators. Not only does this create confusion in legislation and institution building in 
Hungary, and thus delay, it also establishes a practice that may lock in a certain path of 
development (Stoczkiewicz, 2001) that will be increasingly difficult to steer away from later. 
This is made all the more ironic by Hungary’s waste history which from 1949 to the late 1980s 
favoured preventative waste policies, rendering the present trend more a return to the past of the 
West than a step forward.  
 
In order to understand the changes and challenges of harmonising waste legislation, it is 
important to put the EU’s and Hungary’s waste issues in their proper historical contexts. 
Therefore, first I will review the EU’s and Hungary’s past waste policies and only after that 
historical overview will I analyse the challenges brought on by joining the European Union. In 
that main part of the chapter, I will compare requirements for sustainable development and for 
satisfying requirements for EU accession. In conclusion, I will evaluate how these sometimes 
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contradictory requirements are met, and what the compromises made by Hungary imply for the 
country’s future waste practices. 
 
I. Ecological Modernization in the European Union’s Waste Policies 
 
The European Union first started to elevate environmental concerns to communal 
legislative actions in 1973 when it passed what came to be known as its First Environmental 
Action Program (EAP). The latest EAP passed was the Sixth one. It is these general programs 
that define the direction and tasks of environmental legislation in the period to come (ranging 
from four to nine years). Most legislation is passed in the form of directives written and 
proposed by the European Commission, examined by the European Parliament and the Council 
of the European Union.  
 
The first piece of legislation concentrating on wastes was the Framework Directive on 
waste (75/442/EEC) passed in 1975. The ways in which this directive has been amended and 
modified by numerous subsequent directives illustrates very clearly changes in ways of thinking 
about environmental problems, which in turn express the public’s changing environmental 
concerns. Initially, most of the EU’s waste policies remained in a remedial paradigm, tackling 
environmental problems post facto through end-of-pipe technologies. Such technologies with 
regards to waste primarily include landfilling and incineration. These regulations included the 
aforementioned first EU directive on waste, the Waste Oils Directive (75/439/EEC), the 
Hazardous Waste Directive 78/319/EEC (later replaced by the 91/689/EEC), and the Titanium 
Dioxide Directives (78/176/EEC, 82/883/EEC), the Sewage Sludge Used in Agriculture 
Directive (86/278/EEC), and the Municipal Waste Incineration Directive (89/369/EEC and 
89/429/EEC). While in 1981 the Council issued a Recommendation concerning the reuse of 
waste paper, it was not until 1989, five years after the Brundtland Report coined the concept of 
sustainable development, that the Community Strategy for Waste Management established waste 
prevention as a top priority (Gervais, n.d.). It is from this time that we can speak of an accepted 
“waste management hierarchy” (in order of priority): 1) minimization; 2) reuse (without 
chemical transformation of waste’s material); 3) material recovery (recycling); 4) energy 
recovery (some forms of incineration); and 5) final disposal (landfill, incineration). 
 
In 1993, the Fifth EAP, called Towards Sustainability, made several steps towards what 
came to be known as Integrated Product Policy, the title of a White Paper from 2002. The 
essence of these newer sets of regulations is to integrate environmental and economic policies, 
that is, to incorporate environmental concerns into economic planning and technological 
innovation from the beginning rather than saving them as add-on, expandable, features. It is in 
this spirit that numerous waste-related legislations were passed in the last ten years. Some of 
these established economic incentives, such as eco-taxes (e. g. the compulsory minimum tax rate 
on mineral oil introduced in 1993), while others laid down the principles of environmental 
certification, including eco-labelling and audit systems such as EMAS (Council Regulation No 
1836/93). Yet another group of regulations focused on defining the duties of producers and 
consumers aiming for full (cradle-to-grave) responsibility for products, most recently, in the 
areas of packaging waste (94/62/EC), the wastes of electrical and electronic equipment (expected 
to be passed in 2002), and vehicles (2000/53/EC). As a result of these changes in environmental 
paradigms, the principles of present EU waste legislation are the following (often referred to as 
the five P’s):  
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1. Prevention Principle: top priority should be given to waste prevention and 
minimization; 
2. Proximity Principle: waste should be disposed of as close as possible to where it is 
generated; 
3. Producer Responsibility Principle: waste producers should bear cradle-to-grave 
responsibility for any damage caused by the waste they generate; 
4. Polluter Pays Principle: polluters should bear the costs of safe management and 
disposal; 
5. Precautionary Principle: waste management strategies should not take risks even if 
the causal relation between waste and damage is not fully proved. 
 
Such changes were initiated and supported by a new model of production management, 
collectively referred to as industrial ecology. In the words of Robert M. White, the president of 
the USA's National Academy of Engineering, “the objective of industrial ecology is to 
understand better how we can integrate environmental concerns into our economic activities” 
(White, 1994: v). In terms of waste practices, industrial ecology has meant planning for reuse of 
products (after their initial life-span is over), establishing cradle-to-grave product responsibility, 
minimizing toxic by-products and in general increasing eco-efficiency. 
 
Many debate whether this trend is real or whether it is simply clever public relations on 
the part of corporations trying to limit the punitive effects of environmental regulations. 
Proponents of ecological modernization theory, whose focus is broader than the individual firm, 
however also agree that a transition in environmental discourse and practice has begun in these 
countries, with the Netherlands and Japan leading the way (Hajer, 1995; Mol 1995; Spaargen 
and Mol, 1992). Their argument is that even though environmental protection previously tended 
to focus on how to ‘safely’ displace hazards from production, and environmental politics 
concentrated on the distribution of hazards, now the intention is to keep and solve the problem of 
emissions and wastes within the sphere of production. It is in production that emissions can be 
reduced or prevented, and it is in production that by-products can be re-used or recycled. Such an 
internalization of environmental externalities is now seen as consistent with efforts to increase 
efficiency and even as conducive to technological innovation. Furthermore, relying on the 
environmental Kuznets curve, it has been argued that environmental impacts may become 
decoupled from economic growth. In other words, changes in management and new innovations 
will lead to economic growth that no longer spurs commensurate increases in emissions or 
wastes. 
 
Independently of the accuracy of these views, I would also argue that a qualitative 
change has occurred in environmental discourse. Acknowledging the change, however, does not 
necessarily mean endorsing them. Environmental modernization theory in itself doesn’t say 
anything about absolute volumes of waste or emissions, power, costs and the role of the public. 
So, it is with this critical note, that I suggest that ecological modernization theory can offer us a 
vantage point from which to interpret the implications of Hungary’s accession to the EU for her 
waste practices.  
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II. Hungary’s Waste Past 
 
Visual, textual and statistical representations all describe state socialism as a wasteful 
social order. Visual representations of state socialism, such as Antonin Kratovchil’s photos in the 
1990 special issue of the New York Times Magazine, invoke the image of the state socialist 
landscape most familiar in the West--a grey still life composed of shoddy goods, of people 
wearing poor, idiosyncratic clothes surrounded by houses that look like they could fall apart at 
any time, and of piled up garbage and filth. The juxtaposition of images of poverty with images 
of debris, dirt, toxic wastes, and degraded nature tells a story about state socialism that has been 
retold for many decades; megalomaniac, yet outdated, industrialization that left a good portion of 
society in poverty, generated tremendous amounts of waste, and caused environmental 
destruction.  
 
Textual representations in journalistic accounts and scholarly works blame these 
conditions on poor management of the economy and outdated technology. “Open hearth steel 
manufacturing and other outdated, inefficient technologies are still widely used by East 
European and Soviet industries,” says the study of the World Watch Institute in an explanation 
of state socialist wastefulness and pollution (World Watch Paper 99, n.d: 11). In addition to 
backwardness, a “faulty, mismanaged economic system,” has been also invoked as a key cause 
of environmental degradation. 
 
Statistical data usually applied by studies done in the international financial and aid hubs 
and by scholarly works like to point out that state socialist countries’ emissions/GDP, 
emissions/per capita and waste/GDP indexes, as well as material and energy intensities have 
been significantly higher--often multiples of--Western equivalents (Hughes, 1990; World Watch 
Paper 99). The result, as a New York Times author puts it, is “mountains of garbage. Literally, 
garbage” (Lewis, 1990: A21).  
 
The textual, visual, and statistical representations all suggest that state socialism was 
wasteful, both in the sense of squandering resources and in the sense of being full of wastes: it 
produced too many rejects, too much waste and garbage, and too many outdated superfluous 
goods. Despite the infamy of many aspects of central planning, many socialist states, including 
Hungary, also pursued rigorous waste reuse and recycling and to a lesser extent waste reduction. 
In Hungary, one of the first economic laws of Stalinist leadership aimed at organizing the reuse 
of waste materials for industry. Between 1950 and 1959 thirty-four central regulations on the 
collection, storage, delivery and price of waste materials were issued. In the reform period of 
Hungarian state socialism, that began in the mid-1970s, emphasis shifted from reuse and 
recycling to reduction that was encouraged with financial incentives. In 1981, the state 
implemented a system of monitoring, then rare even in the West, that obliged companies to 
prepare material flow charts and material balances in order to facilitate the tracking of toxic by-
products in the production process and to discover inefficiencies. These material flow charts and 
material balances can be seen as precursors to voluntary environmental standards, such as ISO 
and EMAS. 
While not entirely successful even in their own terms, some of the state’s policies made 
significant progress. As a result of the new reform waste regulations implemented in 1981, by 
1987 it was claimed that more than half of the total waste generated was reused. Progress in the 
field of plastic wastes was especially spectacular as their reuse increased by 200%, and with this, 
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20% of total plastic wastes were reused (NÉTI, 1987: 6). While the program did not achieve its 
stated goal of substantially increasing the portion of secondary raw materials among industrial 
inputs (KSH, 1988), it turned out to be quite successful in finding uses for potentially dangerous 
wastes. Before the implementation of the 1981 Waste and Secondary Raw Material Management 
Program, only 17-18% of hazardous wastes were reused or recycled (Tudományos 
Ismeretterjesztő Társulat, 1980), while in 1982 the figure was 21% and by 1986 it was 29% 
(Árvai, 1990). Back then hazardous waste was defined differently than it is in either the EU or 
Hungary’s present system of classification, thus making cross-national and historical quantitative 
comparisons difficult. However the fact that now the rate of recycled wastes of all types is close 
to zero in Hungary (see below) should alert us to the possibility that Hungary’s state socialist 
waste policies worked and that the waste discourses of the postsocialist era do not. 
 
In sum, during the 50 years of central planning in Hungary, the state established an 
extensive infrastructure of waste registration, collection, redistribution, reuse, and recycling. 
Even though the emphases of Hungary’s waste policies changed over time, there has been an 
ongoing public discourse on the amount and sources of waste in industry and agriculture. 
Furthermore, partially as a result of waste laws and a profound cultural propaganda on waste 
reuse, bordering on the cult of waste, the public in Hungary had a strong material conservationist 
attitude. This mentality could have been built on as an important cultural asset in reforming (not 
scrapping) Hungary’s environmental policies; instead, it has been all but eradicated. The 
socialist waste infrastructure had numerous shortcomings including a tendency to encourage 
waste production to fulfil waste quotas, ignorance of pleas to facilitate safe waste dumping, and 
undemocratic enforcement of waste laws. While it is necessary to acknowledge these flaws, it is 
also necessary to debunk the one-sided picture that socialist Hungary did not care about waste.  
 
So why are these “achievements” ignored? One of the main reasons is that statistical data 
prevailed in the representation of centrally planned economies, but more importantly, that such 
statistics concentrated on ratios of waste/GDP, rather than on waste/per capita or ratios of 
recycling of industrial waste--data that would have demonstrated faults with Western waste 
practices and would have highlighted the advantages of state socialism, or at least could have 
presented a more balanced picture. This way, perhaps, the functioning elements of socialist 
waste policies could have been preserved. Second, “indigenous” economists mostly informed by 
neoliberal paradigms themselves despised the state’s intervention in the economy, including 
policies of waste reduction and reuse. Third, these waste policies and practices, while not 
entirely unknown to Western academics and journalists, were not considered to be of an 
environmental nature, but rather merely a curious element of central planning, and thus their 
significance was left unexplored. Finally, we must not ignore that the increasingly visible and the 
truly horrendous environmental record of state socialism in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union 
simply dwarfed any positive achievements of state socialism’s relationship to the environment.  
 
So why insist on the importance of this other environmental legacy of central planning in  
Hungary now? First of all, arguably, there is a remarkable similarity between the above-
mentioned industrial ecology and ecological modernization discourse observed in the West, on 
the one hand, and Hungary’s past waste practices on the other. If that is the case, then, what are 
the reasons and consequences of the EU’s treatment of Hungary as innocent of any kind of 
environmental regulation, especially any progressive ones? And if now it seems that Hungary is 
indeed lacking effective waste policies, should not we look for the causes not in Hungary’s 
socialist legacy but in the demands of a liberal world made upon her? That is, is it possible that 
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in order to meet the EU’s economic criteria--a liberal market economy purged from the state’s 
“interventions”-- Hungary had to return to the past of the West: a free market unfettered by 
environmental and conservation principles? I think raising these questions, even if presently we 
may not have all the answers, is unavoidable if we are truly interested in the meaning of the 
EU’s presence in postsocialist Hungary and the environmental implications of that presence. 
This is what I will turn to in the next section. 
 
III. EU Accession and Hungary’s Dilemmas 
 
Hungary applied for EU membership even before state socialism collapsed (in 1988), but 
membership and especially its ultimate ratification was not taken for granted until relatively 
recently. This is important to realize when we look at the kind of decisions various governments 
made concerning the environment, and waste in particular, since 1989. From the beginning there 
were two pressures that Hungary and the other postsocialist countries in Europe faced: an 
economic transition (often referred to as marketisation, privatisation, or liberalization) and an 
environmental revolution. The latter referred to an expectation that the new regimes would not 
only disclose and clean up the pollution caused by central planning, but that they would also 
avoid the kinds of development that led to the degradation of nature both in the West and in the 
East.  
 
Two models circulated in public discourse about how to achieve both ends 
simultaneously--the economic rationalism and the environmental modernization paradigms. The 
initially strongest expectation has been that liberalization will automatically improve the state of 
the natural environment. 1 This is the assumption that informs this transition discourse, which, 
adopting Dryzek’s (1997) terminology, might be called the ‘economic rationalism discourse.’ 
Many activists and experts, however, hoped that Eastern Europe, enjoying the Veblenesque 
advantage of late-comers, could draw lessons from the mistakes of Western capitalism and build 
an economic system in which environmental concerns were integrated from the beginning 
instead of being saved for later as add-on features. Taking this course, however, would have 
required a more active role for the state, at least a more direct relationship between industry and 
government than the economic rationalism discourse sees as necessary.  
 
Up until the middle of the nineties, postsocialist legislative events (or non-events, as the 
case might be), and actual waste practices conformed more to the economic rationalism model 
than to the ecological modernization paradigm (Gille, 2000). To the extent that liberalization, 
especially in the shape and form dictated by the IMF and World Bank, demanded a much-
reduced role for the state both as owner and regulator, this ‘Wild East’ period of the postsocialist 
transition may be seen as inevitable.  
 
Economic rationalism manifested itself in the following markers: Privatisation meant that 
the state lost control not only over the means of production but also of waste materials, and, 
without a simultaneous new waste legislation, had a radically reduced ground on which to 
influence the fate of production wastes. The privatisation of retail translated into an easy evasion 
of previous obligations of grocery stores to take back bottles and jars for a deposit, which, with 
the simultaneous explosion in disposable packaging, meant a sudden accumulation of packaging 
wastes that neither consumers nor the garbage collection companies were able to handle. Soon, 
garbage collection ceased to be a gratis public service provided by municipal governments (at 
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least in large cities), but since real incomes kept declining through the first half of the nineties, 
most people and businesses resorted to illegal dumping. The sale of the almost forty-year-old 
state waste collection company, MÉH, to a French corporation, for one, imposed radical limits 
on the scope of its activity, that is, the range of waste materials and circle of suppliers. Since the 
company was in a monopolistic position, this single privatisation had national consequences. 
 
Under such circumstances, it would have been crucial to pass new legislation redefining 
the duties of waste producers and scope of authority of the state. Instead, Hungary’s 
comprehensive waste act, which got stuck several times in each phase of its making, didn’t take 
effect until January 2001. What’s more, existing regulations were withdrawn or made 
unenforceable due to legal, economic, and political uncertainties. The fate of the extensive 
Hungarian deposit-refund system is well captured by Hungarian economist, Kaderják 
(1997:169): 
 
With respect to deposit-refund systems, the common experience of the CEECs [Central and 
Eastern European countries] is rather that during the period of transition formerly well-performing 
systems have been partly destroyed (for example, deposit-refund systems on bottles or car 
batteries). 
 
NGOs have also started calling on the EU to retain this positive legacy of state socialism, where 
it still exists (NGO Response, 2001). The mentioned system of monitoring established in the 
1980s that made evaluation of a firm’s waste activities easy and transparent by obliging firms to 
prepare material flow charts and material balances was also dismantled (Romhányi, 1995; 
Takáts, 1996). 
 
Exactly at the time of a deep economic crisis and great uncertainty, the mentioned state 
funds for the rationalization of material and energy use were eliminated, and even though there 
were proposals to include eco-taxes in the new tax system to create a fund for environmental 
purposes, these were ignored or watered down to such an extent that, the new system, as one 
former ministry official wrote, “in the case of waste reuse, … function[ed] as an actual counter-
incentive” (Takáts, 1990). The first half of the nineties, therefore, witnessed the victory of the 
free market, and more specifically that of the economic rationalism paradigm. The state retreated 
from the economy and was left without sufficient income to motivate producers in 
environmentally friendly directions. Further, the reduction of the state apparatus left it ill-
equipped to enforce what regulations remained or slowly passed and in general, it found itself 
much discredited to intervene on behalf of an environmentally conscious economic transition. 
 
It was not until the middle of the 1990s that a change in direction started to be noticeable. 
The new Law on Environmental Protection, passed in 1995, laid down producers’ reporting 
obligations and it introduced a number of eco-taxes, such as environmental load fees, use 
contributions and product charges. The latter initially had been imposed on fuel, tires, 
refrigerators, refrigerants, packaging materials, and batteries [Act LVI of 1995] introduced in 
1996.2 The amount of the charge is reduced by half for those products that are environmentally 
friendly. The revenues from these are, in turn, earmarked for investments that abate pollution as 
well as for waste recuperation and recycling. The long awaited hazardous waste act was also put 
in force in 1996. Both the latter and the Law on Environmental Protection were looked upon as 
transitional measures that would be revised once the EU-conform Act on Waste Management 
was ratified, which, as mentioned, took many years longer than expected. What changes are now 
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needed in order to meet EU requirements? In order to understand Hungary’s tasks, we need to 
know what characterized the country’s waste situation and how it differed from that of the EU. 
(Add footnote: The adoption of the environmental chapter of the Acquis started in 1999. I am 
using data from 2000, which did not considerably differ from data in 1995, based on which, if 
necessary, the environmental criteria for accession and funding targets were or could have been 
decided.)3  
 
Hungary produces roughly 70 million tons of waste, with 28 million tons being biomass.4 
Out of this non-biomass waste, roughly 70% is production waste and 6% is municipal waste 
(with municipal liquid waste roughly 11%).(add footnote: due to the inconsistency in 
Hungararian data collection, in which some authorities categorized data according to the 
hazardousness of waste, others according to their origin, and for example one cannot tell exactly 
how much of hazardous waste is generated in production versus in consumption, the totals of 
these data don’t add up to 100%.)  4% of all wastes (roughly 3.4 million tons, that is, 8% of non-
biomass waste) is hazardous.5 In comparison, the EU’s municipal waste ratio without liquid 
waste is 14%, which means that in Hungary, the share of municipal solid waste is considerably 
lower, than that in the EU. This reflects not so much a “lower developmental stage,” as it is 
commonly implied, but a state socialist past, where consumption was shunned and economic 
growth was forced, even if it meant high waste-ratio production and thus high levels of industrial 
waste. High waste ratios did not constitute a problem for a social order that, as mentioned above, 
ruthlessly pursued 100% recycleability. In sum, the difference between the EU and Hungary is 
not simply that of quantity, indicating a lower stage on the same developmental trajectory, but of 
quality, due to a difference in developmental trajectories. 
 
The rate of recycling for municipal solid waste in Hungary is 3% compared to the EU’s 
average 15%. The existing rates of recycling in former socialist countries are similar to several 
of EU member countries’ rates (such as those of Ireland and Portugal), but in general are lower 
than average rates in the 1980s. In contrast to this difference in municipal waste data, the 
recycling rate for hazardous wastes is 20% in Hungary as compared to 8% in the EU. Given that 
dumping and incinerating hazardous waste is environmentally more risky then recycling, we 
should welcome this variation and study what allows Hungary to surpass the allegedly 
environmentally more progressive EU in this regard.  
 
Out of the country’s 3,000 municipalities, 2,700 have landfills, or as it is often pointed 
out, there is a dump in practically every village, true, this includes “the smallest ditch, as a 
ministry representative said (Farkas 2003). There are 665 registered and municipally run 
landfills for municipal waste, of which only 15% meets current technological standards. In 
addition, however, there are also 620 smaller dump sites, not registered and most likely not 
fulfilling safety requirements. There is one major hazardous waste incinerator in the country, in 
Dorog, with a capacity of 25,000 tons/year, and there are some minor incinerators, some recently 
built, and some older cement kilns, which add up to an overall capacity of 85,000 tons for 
hazardous waste incineration. There is also just one modern hazardous waste landfill, in Aszód, 
which only takes wastes for final (rather than temporary) disposal, 10,000 tons a year. Its overall 
capacity is 300,000 tons that is not expected to be filled until about 2020. Therefore, assuming 
no import and export of hazardous wastes, Hungary cannot incinerate more than 3% of its 
hazardous wastes.6 The overall amount of waste incineration cannot be ascertained from the data 
available because it is lumped together with other types of elimination, such as the desiccation of 
liquid municipal waste, but possibly others, too, which the official of the environmental ministry 
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in charge of the data base I am using was unable to identify. However, the overall ratio of 
incineration is unlikely to be more than 10%. Compared to the practice of many EU countries 
that incinerate as much as a quarter of their total wastes and that have dozens of incinerators,7 
Hungary’s rates seem very low.  
 
Accession countries on the average have higher industrial waste/per capita ratios than EU 
members, the reverse of the mentioned municipal waste ratio difference. My estimates however 
do not allow extrapolating from these averages to Hungary. Her industrial waste per 1000 USD 
of GDP is 72kg, which can be said to be in the middle range of existing EU countries, and well 
below, Finland’s 118 kg and the Czech Republic’s staggering 288 kg. Similarly, and even more 
unambiguously, with 490 kg of municipal wastes per capita, Hungary seems to belong more to 
the West, than to the East, should we insist on such simplified characterizations. Its municipal 
waste per capita is higher than any other candidate country’s we have data for, and even higher 
than that of some EU members.  
 
In sum, the areas in which Hungary’s waste situation seems to be significantly and 
structurally different from the EU’s are: a) Smaller proportion of municipal wastes among total 
wastes generated; b) Significantly smaller proportion of reuse and recycling, except in hazardous 
wastes; c) Significantly smaller proportion of incineration than the EU average. Consequently, 
these differences are leading to a higher rate of landfilling and a lower capacity for hazardous 
waste treatment through modern landfilling and incineration techniques. While it is getting more 
difficult to make the claim that Hungary seems underdeveloped based on her waste generation 
structure and “waste-efficiency” indicators, another commonly made claim, here in the words of 
a study by regional experts, that “the situation in the Central and East-European countries 
resembles to a high degree the situation in OECD countries in the 1980s when landfilling was 
the main disposal technique,” is not completely off the mark (Eurowaste, 2000).  
 
There are two problems with the statement, however. One is related to the 
misinterpretation of Hungary’s waste past. As mentioned, in the 1980s Hungary actually favored 
recycling to landfilling much more than it does now, and possibly more than the OECD did then, 
as well. The other problem is that Western European countries have not made much progress in 
developing alternatives to landfilling either, which still comprises close to two-thirds of the 
treatment options for municipal waste (European Environment Agency, 1999). Furthermore, 
unlike Hungary, the EU has not yet managed to uncouple its waste generation from economic 
growth; in the last ten years economic growth averaged 6% in the EU, while waste generation 
grew by 10% annually. In Hungary, according to latest governmental data, overall waste 
generation declined from 106 million tons in 1990 to 68.7 million tons in 2000, during which 
period economic growth while initially negative, in the second half of the nineties was around 
5%. True, an increase in waste generation has been registered since then and further increases 
are expected in the next few years. 
 
Such data, however, were not made available or used as context at the time the European 
Commission established the accession requirements for former state socialist countries. The EU 
departed from three assumptions: 1) Hungary, as with all former socialist countries, has no 
environmental waste legislation to speak of; 2) she lacks the technical and institutional 
infrastructure necessary for implementing modern waste management methods; and 3) without 
Western assistance, Hungary is incapable of implementing progressive change. As a Market 
Analysis from 2001 stated, “Most of the current environmental difficulties arise from the fact 
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that environmental policy was virtually non-existent under the communist regime” (Trade 
Partners UK, 2001: 2.). The inscrutability and the etatism of state socialist waste policies 
reinforced the conviction in the early 1990s that Hungary must start from a blank page, which 
first requires that the old is demolished. According to some sources, the collapse of the state 
apparatus tore apart existing scientific and policy collaboration and put promising projects on 
hold.8 It would be worthwhile to investigate whether this sudden rupture and the idea that we 
must start anew made the adoption of the environmental (and especially the waste) chapter of the 
Acquis slower than was necessary.  
 
Based on the discrepancies between Hungarian and EU waste practices (if not 
principles), the EU had two major concerns. First, it wanted to make sure that by admitting 
Hungary (and other former socialist countries) it would not unduly add to environmental 
problems caused by wastes. That the EU has such fears is apparent from studies lamenting that 
its waste output would double, given present-day data, when the first wave of candidate 
countries joined. Not only will Enlargement worsen the EU’s waste statistics, it is also feared 
that candidate countries’ loose environmental standards will offer an undesirable competitive 
advantage. It is curious that at the end of the eighties and early nineties, it was exactly this 
looseness, though not of regulation, but of enforcement, that lured EU-constituent businesses to 
the region. It seems as if the EU itself couldn’t decide between its environmental principles and 
its economic interests. For example, in 2002 it granted exemptions to Hungary, along with most 
other candidate countries, in fulfilling EU requirements concerning waste policies. Hungary 
received a four-year exemption from implementing EU-conform legislation on hazardous wastes, 
on the recovery and recycling of packaging wastes, and a fifteen-year grace period in the area of 
urban wastewater treatment. 
 
Indeed one cannot appreciate the full relevance of the Enlargement unless we treat the 
European Union not merely as a bundle of legal and institutional arrangements, as it usually is 
done in studies of the Eastern Enlargement, but also as a powerful global actor that represents 
and is supported by specific (rather than universal) economic interests. From-within critiques of 
the Union often bring attention not merely to the commonplace of democratic deficit, but with a 
positive spin, to the corporate voices that have control over many decisions and resources. 
Similarly, one should not take it for granted that catching up with the European Union with 
regards to waste treatment capacities is merely a humanitarian or environmentalist goal. While 
the EU sees itself as the environmental conscience of the world, and has played important 
leadership roles in numerous environmental issues in the international arena, actual legislation, 
policy, and aid within its environmental activities seem to reflect certain biases. In this respect, I 
will address two different modes of presence of the EU in former socialist countries and examine 
the extent that these different modes are complimentary or contradictory to the EU’s presence as 
a set of laws. I will look at what effects certain EU-constituent businesses and then EU aids have 
on Hungary’s future waste practices. 
 
As no market analysis of Eastern Europe fails to mention, the big opportunity for 
environmental business in the region comes from former socialist countries’ desire to join the 
EU. “The goal of EU accession is the main driver for improvement of the environment in 
Hungary and the recent attention given to the latter (after a sluggish start) by the Hungarian 
Authorities looks set to continue,” says a UK analysis (Trade Partners UK, 2001: 2.). This is 
good news for investors. “The size of the Hungarian environmental market was valued at 
US$700 million in 1997 and was expected to rise about 40% to the end of 2000. Further growth 
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between 2000 and 2010 is expected” (Trade Partners UK, 2001: 3.). A study published by Frost 
and Sullivan also emphasizes that, “by far the most important driver of the (municipal waste 
management) market over the forecast period is expected to be EU expansion and harmonisation, 
leading to the increasingly urgent need to raise standards and improve infrastructures” (quoted in 
Davies, 2000: 3.) The study commissioned by the U.S. Department of Commerce also implies 
that with Western doors closed to Hungary, the country’s environmental record is unlikely to 
improve without outside intervention. As noted by Svastics (1999: 1), “The fact that Hungary 
became a member of the OECD in 1996 and subsequently made a commitment to joining the 
European Union (EU) has increased government attention to environmental issues.” The same 
study explicitly laments that “municipal waste incineration is very scarce in Hungary” (Svastics, 
1999: 8).  
 
Indeed, the mentioned “shortage” in waste treatment capacity has been seen as a magnet 
for Western firms, increasingly unable to sell their facilities in the EU. Let us note, however, that 
a weakened state (see above) unable to enforce environmental regulations, or the laxness of 
some of these regulations themselves, have been just as important in attracting waste investors to 
the region as the capacity shortage. The years immediately following 1989 saw a veritable 
“waste-rush” of multinational incinerator corporations to the East, as I analyzed earlier (Gille 
2000b). (move to footnote, because it appears in my previous EP article.) [Between 1988 and 
1995 there were an estimated 18 million tons minimum of annual incinerator capacity proposed 
just in Russia, the Baltics, Hungary, Poland, the Czech Republic, and Slovakia, with about 93% 
of these capacities offered for export by Western countries.9 Put another way, about 187 facilities 
were proposed in the region, with Germany and Austria leading the way, accounting for 30% of 
the offers. 
 
Unfortunately, EU accession is unlikely to deter such imports. The National Waste 
Management Plan (OHT) for 2003-2008 is planning six new incinerators even though in the 
parliamentary debate of the OHT, one reader considered the four or five original excessive 
(Parliamentary Committee Minutes, 2001). Furthermore, it states that “Hungary must have a 
nation-wide incineration capacity of 170 thousand t/year,” which means a double of its present 
capacity. The plan plainly puts profitability concerns before environmental and social ones: 
 
In certain sensitive regions of the country (e.g. where industrial activities are concentrated, where 
the geological conditions are special, where tourism represents a seasonal change, or where more 
of these factors are present simultaneously) construction of an incinerator can only be postponed 
for a period of time, but in the long term there is no alternative for (sic!) the disposal of waste 
remaining. [National Waste Management Plan, 2002, 28.] 
 
Was it the pressure of such lobbies or was it the Western opinion that Hungary is 
backward in terms of its incinerator capacity that compelled the authors of ? Or is it the synergy 
between the backwardness discourse and the economic interests that put their stamps so 
powerfully on the future waste practices of the country? And if so, how does this synergy come 
about and how is it reproduced? 
 
First, the EU tells Hungary what waste treatment capacities it needs to have in order to be 
accepted as truly European, then it provides the “aid” to fulfil the requirements, and finally, most 
of this aid makes its way to back the pockets of EU-constituent producers of environmental 
technologies. There are three main funds that were established for assisting former socialist 
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countries in their transitions and in adopting the Acquis. The earliest one was PHARE, followed 
by ISPA (Instrument for Structural Pre-Accession Aid), for transportation and environmental 
objectives, and SAPARD (Special Aid for Pre-Accession in Agriculture and Rural Development) 
for agricultural and regional development. Among Hungary’s ISPA Funds, waste management 
projects received priority. Out of the total amount of ISPA contribution between 2000 and 2002 
(547 million Euros), 30% percent were awarded to various waste management projects (not 
counting waste water treatment—another area of preference).  
 
I do not have access to data to be able to determine whether technologies or firms from 
the EU are the most common beneficiaries of these projects, and most of the bidding is still open, 
but clearly, firms from Western Europe have an advantage in this market, after all they know 
best what will truly conform to EU standards. Market analyses also demonstrate that east 
Europeans prefer Western environmental technology to domestic alternatives (Regional 
Environmental Center, 1997). It is also a little concealed fact that non-EU firms are excluded 
from bidding on projects to be completed with EU funds (unless through their European 
subsidiaries), much to the annoyance of the US and Canada. North-American market studies 
explicitly lament the small and decreasing share of US companies in the East European waste 
technologies market, which now, with the departure of the US giant, Waste Management Inc., 
seems to be irreversible. Such an exclusion makes it clear that the primary aim of 
“environmental” aid is not for Eastern Europe to adopt the environmentally most beneficial 
solutions through a truly open bidding, to have the ability to choose according to the principle of 
‘Best Available Technology,’ but rather to turn the region into a market for Western European 
goods.10 
 
The compromise of environmental principles becomes even clearer when we notice that 
the bidding announcements for these waste projects are about building new landfills. With the 
pretext that old, dangerous landfills have to be eliminated, the Hungarian National Waste 
Management Plan aims at establishing a network of regional dumps, so all settlements would 
have a landfill for municipal solid waste within a 30 kilometre radius. The defenders of the 
Hungarian National Waste Management Plan argue that it is at this density that landfills become 
profitable (Parliamentary Committee Minutes, 2001). But if the goal to reduce waste amounts is 
achieved, won’t that change the profitability calculations? Furthermore, how does this plan get 
us closer to the EU ideal of reducing the share of landfilled wastes?  
 
Or are policymakers motivated more by blindly following the mentioned Proximity 
Principle than by decreasing waste and dumping? While the Proximity Principle according to 
which waste should be disposed of as close as possible to where it is generated works great in 
countries where there is already a network of legal and up-to-date dumps, in the candidate 
countries, where the existing network is insufficient either in safety standards or in capacity, it 
may act as an unintended inducement to build dumps and thus further marginalizing waste 
prevention goals. More importantly, however, as long as only waste dumping receives generous 
EU funding, and waste reduction receives nothing other than the obligatory symbolic gestures in 
programmatic documents, the policy emphasis on landfill capacity-building will reinforce 
existing motivation for end-of-pipe technologies, and, on the long run, will lock in future waste 
practices making a (hypothetical) move in a more preventative direction less and less feasible. 
 
The practical consequences of both EU aid and EU business may be too early to see, but 
if Hungary’s National Waste Management Plan is any indication, end-of-pipe technologies are 
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still the favoured method of dealing with unwanted materials. In fact, the Plan aims to radically 
overhaul the existing economic incentives for recycling and reuse in order to relax restrictions 
and penalties waste producers presently face. While a new policy tool, a weak alternative to the 
existing system of product charges, was allowed to pass at the end of December 2002, the 
Hungarian Parliament voted against the further relaxation of the producers’ responsibility in the 
product charges system. It is clear, nevertheless, that the pressure from industry to loosen waste 
legislation and especially to forego economic incentives for waste minimization and recycling 
remains unrelenting. In this often-fierce struggle between industrial lobbies and 
environmentalists, the meaning of Europeanness is also contested. 
Since Europe is a powerful symbol, most participants in the debate do try to define their 
positions as closer to that of the EU. There are several difficulties in evaluating such claims. 
First, it is never clear whether the reference is EU law or EU practice. In that regard, it may be 
said that the National Waste Management Plan does not conform with EU ambitions. The plan 
places reuse and recycling above incineration and dumping in the waste management hierarchy, 
while EU practice still favours dumping.11  
Second, in the case of democracy and economic reforms, it is relatively clear what 
policies conform with the EU. In the case of waste policy tools, however, the answer is much 
more ambiguous. While the EU lays down the desired principles and goals of waste management 
in directives which the member countries adopt in the course of a few years, how a member 
country’s state apparatus will go about achieving those goals remains in the scope of national 
authority, and thus varies. As a result, there are diverse systems in place within the EU in the 
different areas of waste management, and not all are equally effective, and presumably not all are 
equally practical in the case of Hungary. There is quite a variety especially in methods of 
achieving EU objectives concerning packaging wastes and recycling. While environmental 
activists are still demanding the maintenance and strengthening of the mentioned system of 
product charges, and the reinstitution of deposit systems, their opponents (occasionally Ministry 
officials, and the association representing manufacturing interests) point to various EU principles 
protecting the uninhibited working of the market. During the screening process, for example, the 
EU objected to product charges since those ultimately act as subsidies for production costs. 
(Since product charges are supposed to be pumped back to the companies for extending their 
reusing and recycling capacities, product charges could be seen as a form of subsidy.) The EU 
also prohibits obligatory deposits on packaging materials since those may function as hidden 
import duties, as Belgium’s recent example shows.  
 
There is also the question of which set of laws and policy tools can actually guarantee 
that Hungary will be able to fulfil its promises to achieve 50% in its rate of recycling by 2006 (in 
accordance with the temporary exemptions mentioned). Considering all these constraints—in 
quotas, policy tools, and principles—and the existing diversity in practices, EU-conformity turns 
out to be a slippery term, but that is exactly why it so adaptable to political agendas of all kinds. 
 
Why get upset about laws? They can be changed after all, one might say. While laws and 
policies are indeed reversible, their effects may not be. The postsocialist transition and 
Hungary’s subsequent Europeanisation is not only about markets and law. These radical 
transformations require and call for a new kind of culture and a new kind of subjectivity. The 
way in which a postsocialist society goes about joining the West will produce a certain kind of 
consumer, employee, or manager. The thrifty and waste-conscious material culture that 
developed under state socialism today may seem as backward and contrary to “European” 
consumerism, rendering preventative waste policies less attractive and achievable at a much 
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greater social cost. It is hardly a surprise that despite the 5th Environmental Action Programme, 
waste generation is on the increase in the EU itself. Similarly in Hungary, short of explicit policy 
tools to rein in consumption, it seems that even the more modest waste-efficiency-increasing 




The EU has been sending mixed messages to Hungary. On the face of it, the EU is for 
preventative waste policies and is concerned about the environmental effects of economic 
growth. This is the position espoused in the Environmental Action Plans, the Directives, and the 
programmatic studies. However, when we look at actual practices, particularly investments and 
economic and infrastructure requirements, the EU stands for unsustainable development and for 
putting economic interests before environmental interests. Given the contradictory sets of 
expectations placed on candidate countries, it is not surprising that environmental harmonisation 
was lagging and that business interests were dominating the legislative process in the individual 
accession countries. Can environmental civil society turn this trend around? 
 
The European Commission has loudly solicited NGO participation in the accession 
negotiations, but as these NGOs now lament, this has been merely a symbolic gesture. First, 
NGOs were excluded from committees deciding about granting ISPA and SAPARD funds, 
which, as mentioned, is where numerous decisions with long-term consequences were made. 
Second, the meetings between the Environmental DG and green NGOs of the region have been 
futile. The NGOs, armed with data and expert studies in the best spirit of professionalism, 
demanded introducing accession requirements to safeguard their countries’ biodiversity from the 
adverse ecological effects of meeting other EU requirements, in the areas of infrastructure (road 
construction) and agriculture. Yet, the Commission repeatedly prevented its comments and 
opinions made at these meetings from being printed in the resulting summaries of the minutes, 
because they “did not want to be held accountable later for not fulfilling promises made there” 
(Anonymous 2001). Ultimately, there were no practical steps taken to enforce NGO-suggested 
accession conditions. Symbolic gestures for civil society involvement will obviously produce 
symbolic rather than real results. Whether NGOs and social movements have more leverage once 
inside the EU structure remains to be seen, but their role in holding the EU to its principles will 
surely remain crucial. 
Endnotes 
1. Reform economists argued already in the 1970s that harder budget constraints and more 
independence for enterprises in investment decisions--in sum, a free market--would force them 
to use natural resources more sparingly and with greater care. For detailed discussions and 
evaluations of the reform economists’ approach to environmental problems, see DeBardeleben 
(1985) and Gille (1997). 
2. Product charges on transportation fuel had been in effect since 1992 (Lehoczki and Balogh, 
1997). 
3. The following data are complied from the Hungarian National Waste Management Plan, about 
which more later. As the members of the Hulladék Munkaszövetség, the most important 
Hungarian NGO dealing with waste issues pointed out, the data are incomplete and do not add 
up (Kukabúvár 2002). Indeed, I found it hard to navigate the data provided especially for 
comparative purposed. In light of these valid criticisms, I restrict myself to reporting on the most 
basic figures. 
4. According to Hungarian lawmakers this is made up of agricultural and forestry residues 
entirely recycled through biological cycles. 
5. Roughly one quarter of it is comprised by red mud resulting from aluminium production. 
6. Hungarian data in the National Waste Management Plan show 6% of hazardous wastes are 
treated by incineration and other forms of elimination. 
7. Reliable and comparable data on incineration are very hard to come by the even according to 
the EU’s own offices. 
8. An example is the waste dump registry initiated by the Alliance of Technical Professionals in 
the 1980s. 
9. My calculation is based on Greenpeace data from Gluszynski and Kruszewska (1996). 
10. This is not to imply that North-American technologies are environmentally friendlier. 
11. This was pointed out by several participants of the meeting of the Parliamentary committee 
evaluating the draft of the HWMP in June 2001 (Parliamentary Committee Minutes, 2001), 
however, the final Plan does not establish a clear and concrete preference for recycling either. 
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